On what we may want, when we say that we don’t want to die. Some philosophical reflections on the rationality of “dying off” and “living on”

A classic theistic hope, which is intrinsically linked with the expectance of the afterlife, is the hope for an immortal soul. However, the role of philosophy of religion is not so much to argue for or against the existence of an immortal soul, but rather to decide on the rational justification for the underlying human hope by way of elaborating on its conceivable significance for human life. In this light, the question arises, what we may actually rationally want, when we say that we don’t want to die. Two general philosophical attempts for allowing the rational expectance of an afterlife are presented, the first one allowing for a personal bodily afterlife without reference to a substantial soul, the second one allowing for an anonymous spiritual afterlife without reference to a personal afterlife. Considering personal bodily afterlife, I critically discuss the transhumanist conception of life as a linear process of self-continuation not internally related to death, as well as a moralist foundation for a personal survival in the face of the importance of goodness threatened by death. The subsequent sketch of the dialectic of personal life intends to establish, first, that personal life is essentially temporally limited (death is an a priori of life), and secondly, that the idea of a personal afterlife is burdened by an epistemic dilemma, insofar as it reveals to be either meaningless or unintelligible. To resolve this dilemma, a conception of an intelligible impersonal afterlife is introduced, which is based on the existential devotion to an impersonal immortal cause